Cornell Law Library

Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

5-2002

Ethics of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and
Marketing Litigation
James A. Henderson Jr.
Cornell Law School, james-henderson@lawschool.cornell.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Litigation Commons, Marketing Law
Commons, Products Liability Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Henderson, James A. Jr., "Ethics of Enterprise Liability in Product Design and Marketing Litigation" (2002). Cornell Law Faculty
Publications. Paper 811.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/811

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

ECHOES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN
PRODUCT DESIGN AND
MARKETING LITIGATION
James A. Henderson,Jr.t

American courts talk as though they are imposingstrict enterpriseliability on product manufacturers, but in truth they do so only with respect to
manufacturingdefects. In product design and marketing litigation, manufacturers' liability is based on fault. The reason why strict liability is inappropriate for the generic product hazards associated with design and
marketing is that, in sharp contrast to manufacturingdefects, the conditions
necessaryfor insurance to function are not satisfied. Users and consumers
control genericproduct risks to a sufficiently great extent that any insurance
scheme based on strict enterprise liability would be destroyed by combinations
of adverse selection and moral hazard. And yet, here and there, courts are
imposing strict liability for harm caused by manufacturers' design and marketing decisions. These "echoes of enterprise liability" involve unique fact
patterns in which adverse selection and moral hazard do not threaten the
viability of the insurance schemes implicit in liability without fault. In
reaching these remarkable outcomes, courts stretch existing doctrine beyond
traditionallimits. Understandingwhy these echoes arise and how they rest
on uniquefactual circumstances should help prevent misunderstandingsregarding their value as guides to future developments in American products
liability.
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INTRODUCTION

American courts do not impose strict liability on product manufacturers for their design and marketing decisions. Strict liability
would involve "enterprise liability"-imposing liability on manufacturers merely because their products have caused harm without requiring that the products be unreasonably dangerous. Manyjurisdictions,
encouraged by broad language in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,' talk
of imposing "strict liability" on manufacturers for mistakes in design
and marketing. 2 And a handful of courts have even considered the
possibility of actually imposing a form of strict liability by attributing
to manufacturers knowledge of risks that were not scientifically knowable at the time of original distribution. 3 But the overwhelming majority of American courts reject attribution of knowledge and judge
the manufacturers' design and marketing efforts against a reasonableness standard that sounds in negligence. 4 The recently promulgated
Restatement (Third) of Torts: ProductsLiability, upon which the author
served as Reporter, reflects the reality that courts base manufacturers'
liability for design and warning on negligence, even while many courts
1
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)-(2)(a) (1965) (stating that "[o]ne
who sells any product in a defective condition... is subject to liability" "although... the seller
has exercised all possible care" (emphasis added)).
2 See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 553-59 (Cal.
1991) (discussing the "failure-to-warn theory of strict liability").
3 See, e.g., Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (NJ. 1982) (leading
case); see also Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1143-44 (Mont. 1997) (applying
"imputation of knowledge doctrine" as part of strict liability for failure to warn).
4 See, e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Colo. 1993) (en banc);
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998).
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continue to talk about "strict liability for defective design and failure
to warn."5
This Article modifies this widely acknowledged and generally accurate vision of fault-based liability for design and warning defects.
For the first time, the relevant case law reveals unmistakable echoes of
strict enterprise liability. Here and there, without explicitly acknowledging, or perhaps even appreciating, what is happening, courts in
design and warning cases are imposing strict liability on manufacturers based on the circumstance that products have caused harm, rather
than because, in addition to causing harm, the products are unreasonably dangerous. 6 These distinctive echoes have nothing to do with
unknowable risks. Instead, courts seem to intuit that the reasons for
generally avoiding strict liability in design and warning litigation do
not apply in the unusual fact patterns before them.
To understand these phenomena, it will be necessary to re-examine why courts have not applied strict liability to claims based on
product design and marketing. This Article demonstrates that courts
have generally rejected strict liability in connection with design and
marketing because the conditions necessary for insurance to perform
its function of distributing risk cannot be satisfied. The echoes of enterprise liability identified in this analysis constitute judicial reactions
to unique factual circumstances involving generic product hazards in
which, as in cases involving manufacturing defects, the insurance
mechanism functions as intended.
If this analysis is correct, the special facts of each case justify these
echoes. Moreover, by responding in this manner, courts may picture
themselves as fulfilling the promise of "strict products liability" that
resonates in the American legal psyche. However, judicial attempts to
expand on these examples of strict liability will threaten the future
stability of design and warning litigation. If significant expansion
were to occur, these echoes would soon crush worthwhile enterprises
under mountains of uninsurable risk. Analyzing these distinctive echoes not only reveals interesting and otherwise puzzling phenomena in
recent product design and warning decisions, but also makes clear
why they cannot be expanded upon in design and warning litigation
generally.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998).
6 See, e.g., Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1995); infra
notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
5
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I
(EL) IN AMERIcAN TORT LAW

A. Historical and Philosophical Background
In this analysis, the term "enterprise liability" (EL) connotes that
commercial enterprises are strictly liable for the harms they cause, irrespective of the care they take. 7 One can trace the intellectual history of EL back to the post-World War II era in this country.8 By the
early 1950s, legal academics widely endorsed EL.9 Since the early
1960s, it has played a prominent role in the rhetoric surrounding
American tort law in general and products liability law in particular. 10
Replacing fault-based liability with EL shifts attention from simply encouraging actors to invest in care to also requiring them to insure
against losses. Both negligence and EL pressure commercial enterprises to invest in accident prevention up to, but not necessarily beyond, the point at which it is cheaper to incur accidental losses than it
is to prevent them."1 But under EL, courts also require enterprises to
compensate victims for those residual accident losses that are cheaper
to incur than to prevent.1 2 Under negligence, victims bear the
13
residual accident losses.
7 See George L. Priest, The invention ofEnterpriseLiability:A CiticalHistory of theIntellectualFoundationsof Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463 (1985) ("[E]nterprise liability[ ] provides ... that business enterprises ought to be responsible for losses resulting
from products they introduce into commerce." (footnote omitted)).
8 See, e.g., Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 501,
506-19 (1948).
9 See Priest, supranote 7, at 463 ("By the mid-1950s, the theory of enterprise liability
commanded almost complete support within the academic community.... .").
10
Id. at 461; see also Mark Geistfeld, Should EnterpriseLiability Replace the Rule of Strict
Liabilityfor Abnormally DangerousActivities2, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611, 613 (1998) ("[Enterprise
liability] has been the intellectual force behind the dramatic expansion in tort liability
since midcentury .... "); Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of EnterpriseLiability and Common
Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1285, 1333 (2001) ("[E]nterprise liability... has exerted a substantial influence on our law throughout the course of the twentieth century.").
Discussing enterprise liability, Professor Priest explains that "[s]ince 1960, our modem
civil liability regime has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-American legal system." Priest, supra note 7, at 461.
11 The most famous articulation of this principle, of course, is that ofJudge Learned
Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). See generally
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (discussing the social
function of the negligence concept and the fault system of accident liability courts have
built upon it).
12 See, e.g.,Judge Traynor's famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (stating that "[e]ven if there is no negligence," under strict
liability "the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business").
13 If the actor is negligent, then the victim's costs are shifted to the actor. But the
phrase "residual costs" implies the absence of negligence, in which case there is no liability
on the part of the actor, and the victim bears the costs of the actor's activity. See Posner,
supra note 11, at 32-33.

HeinOnline -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 961 2001-2002

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:958

Thus, EL constitutes an insurance/compensation system in which
the primary objective is loss shifting and spreading rather than loss
management and prevention. Enterprise liability does not merely involve insurance; it is insurance. 1 4 Enterprises held strictly liable under
EL function as insurers; accident victims who receive compensation
for their losses are the insureds. Proponents of EL have tended to
adopt an instrumental, efficiency-oriented perspective;' 5 but fairness
and rights-based theorists also applaud its objectives.1 6 According to
some observers, trends in American liability law in recent decades
have been in the direction of replacing traditional negligence with
various forms of EL. 17 Commentators widely believe the expansion of
the products liability system during this same period has played an
8
important part in reinforcing and accelerating these trends.'
B.

The Necessary Conditions for Maintaining a Viable EL-Based
Insurance System

A viable EL system requires that several conditions be satisfied.
Three are most critical: first, the choice of subject enterprises must be
fair and the boundaries must be specific; second, workable causation
triggers must be present to identify valid claims; and finally, the insurance system established by EL must avoid the threats of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Regarding the task of selecting and describing the EL boundaries, enterprises must not appear to have been included or excluded
arbitrarily, in order to satisfy political expediency. Commentators 19
have justly criticized attempts in recent decades to single out the as14 In contrast, insurance plays no inherent, logically necessary role in connection with
fault-based liability. Actors who are likely to be liable for negligently caused harm may
choose to purchase commercial insurance against that contingency and victims who are
likely to suffer loss at the hands of other actors may choose to purchase insurance covering
those losses. But negligence-based liability functions perfectly well if neither actors nor
victims buy insurance. From the standpoint of pure theory, actors do not need liability
insurance and, from the standpoint of public policy, one may question whether actors,
even if they want commercial insurance against negligence-based liability, should be allowed to buy it.

See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in ProductsLiability,
69 CAL. L. REv. 919, 931-36 (1981); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J.
15

LEGAL STUD. 1, 24-25 (1980).
See Henderson, supra note
16
17

15, at 936-39.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

18

See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Implementing EnterpriseLiability:A Comment on Henderson and

Twerski, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1157 (1992); see also Priest, supra note 7, at 463 ("In my view, the
contours of modem tort law reflect a single coherent conception of the best method to
control the sources of product-related injuries.").
19 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malpractice:
The Virginia ObstetricalNo-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REv. 1451 (1988).
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bestos industry for especially harsh liability treatment, 20 or the obstetrical profession for especially lenient treatment. 2 1 Moreover, even if
the selection of covered enterprises is even-handed, the description of
these enterprises must be specific, so that the threshold question of
whether EL applies is placed beyond serious controversy in most cases.
Simply stated, the boundaries must be sufficiently bright-line to avoid
elaborate balancing on a case-by-case basis.
The second necessary condition for maintaining the viability of
an EL system is the development of workable causation triggers. Conceptually, these triggers will consist of both actual and proximate causation. In most EL systems, a claimant proves the first, essentially
empirical, element of actual causation by showing that the claimant's
harm would not have occurred but for the enterprise having acted in
the first instance. 22 In addition to but-for causation, which is capable
of including within its reach an overwhelmingly large number of potential claims, EL systems also must impose a second, essentially normative, requirement of proximate causation. Even if a claimant's
harm is actually caused by a defendant's enterprise, it must be the
type of harm, suffered by the type of victim, that a reasonable person
would anticipate when implementing a particular version of EL in the
23
first instance.
The third necessary condition for EL viability relates to maintaining the integrity of the insurance system established to cover valid
claims. Of the first three prerequisites of viability, this is the one ob24
servers most often overlook or downplay in assessing EL's potential.
In any insurance system, insureds transfer their risks of loss to insurers, who pool the risks of many insureds in order to render predictable the anticipated aggregate losses that will be experienced. 25 In
20 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 387 (N.J. 1984) (noting that standard of knowledge applicable to experts in the field would apply with particular harshness
to manufacturers in fields that impact public health).
21 See, e.g., Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 38.2-5000-5021 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001). For a description of the Act, see
Peter H. White, Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 VA. L.
REv. 1487, 1489-94 (1988).
22 SeeWiLLUske L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 242 (3d ed. 1964)
("The defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred

without it.").
23 The best-known American articulation of this requirement in the context of negligence law is ChiefJudge Cardozo's dictum in Palsgrafv.Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E.

99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed
24 But see Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and InsuranceDynamics of Mass Tort Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 495-505 (1984); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Product-RelatedRisk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of EnterpriseLiability, 6 ROGER WILuLAms U. L. Rxv. 213, 238-41 (2000); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and
Modem Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1550-63 (1987).
25
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 2 (3d ed. 2000).
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connection with EL, the enterprise functions as insurer and the insureds are either bystander victims or customers who automatically receive insurance against loss when they purchase goods or services
from the enterprise. For any insurance system to survive, the risks to
be covered must be ascertainable at the time of their transfer, ex ante,
and the losses must be ascertainable when claims are made, ex post.
In addition, insureds must pay premiums-in connection with EL, by
means of uniform increments embedded in the prices of goods and
services supplied commercially by the enterprise-that reflect their
contributions to the relevant risk pools. The covered losses experienced by individual insureds will not necessarily be proportional to
the premiums each paid earlier. 2 6 But, in the aggregate and over
time, premiums paid in must cover claims paid out.
The contractual mechanism by which insurers keep premiums
proportional to insureds' contributions to the risk pools is risk classification. 27 Risk classification combats adverse selection, which occurs
when high-risk insureds pay premiums that do not adequately reflect
their high-risk status-when they are undercharged relative to lowerrisk insureds. 28 When this happens, lower-risk insureds leave the insurance pools that are overcharging them, 29 and the insurer must
raise premiums to cover the higher-risk insureds who remain. Such
premium increases precipitate further exodus by a new set of relatively lower-risk insureds, requiring further premium increases, and so
on. Risk classification protects against this "unraveling" of insurance
pools by making sure that participants in the risk pools pay premiums
that are fairly proportional to the risks of loss those participants bring
with them. If for any reason-as with most EL systems-the premiums charged are uniform across insureds, either the risks contributed
by insureds must also be uniform or the choice of whether to be covered must not be within individual insureds' control.30
26 The objective of insurance is to hold harmless those insureds who experience relatively larger losses, ex post, in exchange for affordably smaller premiums, ex ante. See
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK

1-2 (1986).

27 See ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 4.
28 Id. at 3-4.
29 This assumes that lower-risk insureds realize they are being overcharged, a reasonable assumption in a competitive insurance market.
30 Under EL, the premiums charged are uniform because it is all but impossible to
price discriminate when commercially distributing goods and services. Moreover, the risks
of loss contributed by insureds are not likely to be uniform, if only because the measure of
recovery in tort will reflect the idiosyncrasies of individual plaintiffs. See George L. Priest, A
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1350 (1981). It follows that the
best and only chance of combating adverse selection is the fact that most insureds have no
real choice regarding whether or not to be covered. Bystander victims certainly have no
choice; nor, for that matter, do most purchasers of needed goods and services against

whom manufacturers' disclaimers have little legal effect. Cf infra notes 177-82 and accom-
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Another threat to the viability of any insurance scheme is moral
hazard-the natural tendency for insureds, unless prevented by the
relevant terms of coverage, to increase their risks of incurring covered
losses by conduct engaged in after the insurance arrangements take
effect. 31 Like adverse selection at the time of contracting, moral haz-

ard after contracting threatens to allow higher-risk insureds to pay less
than they should for coverage. And also like adverse selection, moral
hazard tends to drive lower-risk insureds out of the insurance pools,
thereby threatening the insurance scheme with crushing liabilities at
the hands of the higher-risk insureds who remain. The only means of
combating moral hazard in commercially marketed insurance is careful drafting of the contracts to deny coverage for losses resulting from
deliberate or reckless post-contract conduct by insureds that significandy increases the relevant risks of loss. 32 When the law requires
enterprises to act as insurers, the law itself must perform the same
protective function.
The implications of the foregoing descriptions of adverse selection and moral hazard for maintaining the viability of an EL-based
insurance system are clear. Reliance on the sort of complex contractual language typically employed in commercial insurance policies is
out of the question. 3$ The terms of EL coverage are imposed in law
and thus will be relatively crude when measured by commercial insurance standards. Moreover, the law discourages and even prohibits at34
tempts by enterprises to modify their legal obligations via contract.
It follows that the applicable law governing the obligations of the enterprise must ensure that higher-risk individuals cannot self-selectively
obtain coverage at the same cost as lower-risk individuals. The law
must not allow those who do obtain coverage to increase the risk of
covered losses significantly once the enterprise's obligation to insure
is in place. Victims, in other words, must play a passive role in the EL
panying text (discussing Second Circuit case imposing strict liability under "informed consent" concept).
31
32

See ABRAHAi, supra note 25, at 4.

All commercial insurance contracts covering accidental loss exclude situations in
which applicants know particular losses are likely to occur, or in which insureds knowingly
or recklessly cause covered losses. See, e.g., Unigard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 579
P.2d 1015, 1017 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (fire insurance policy excluded losses that were
.either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured" (emphasis omitted)); see
also Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 312 S.E.2d 177, 178-79 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (fire
policy excluded losses when "the hazard was increased by any means within the control or
knowledge of the insured").
33 The policy language typically devoted to combating these threats is quite lengthy.
See, e.g., ABRAHAMi, supra note 25, at 4.

34 See generallyJames A. Henderson, Jr., Agreements Changingthe Forumfor Resolving MalpracticeClaims, Lw & CorEmp. PRoBs., Spring 1986, at 243 (discussing the effectiveness of
alternative methods by which insurers modify their obligations through arbitration and
pretrial screening panels).
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system. 35 When covered accidental losses are likely to result from the
use or consumption of instrumentalities provided by the enterprise to
its customers, those customers must not be able to increase the risks of
covered losses through their modes of use or consumption. Instead,
the purchase of goods and services must be tantamount, from the insurance standpoint, to the placement of a wager on a roulette wheel.
Once the bet is made-once the insured purchases the goods and
services along with the built-in insurance against accidental loss-the
purchasers or victims must not have the power to manipulate significantly the chances of incurring loss in a manner that is detrimental to
36
the enterprise in its role as insurer.
Two comparatively less important prerequisites for maintaining
EL viability remain. First, the probability that any individual exposed
to risk will actually suffer a covered loss must be small. Invoking the
costly claims apparatus of EL should not be a routine, commonplace
event. Second, each covered loss, when it occurs, should typically be
substantial. When the losses caused by an enterprise tend to be comparatively small, especially in connection with tort-based EL administered by courts, forms of self-insurance by potential victims are
appropriate. 37 Together, these concerns regarding the probabilities
and magnitudes of loss reflect not only the substantive objectives of
EL, but also legitimate concerns regarding EL's viability. To some extent, the plaintiff's bar and contingent fee arrangements will screen
claimants and prevent EL systems from being "pecked to death" by
large numbers of relatively small claims.3 8 Tort-based EL systems,
however, must also protect themselves by defining covered losses to
minimize their exposure to nuisance claims.

35

See generally Richard A. Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrugInjuries, 59 VA. L.

Rxv. 1, 90-99 (1973) (discussing this thesis in the drug context in light of the fact that drug
consumers are in the worst position to reduce the risk of injury).
36
Cf supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing contractual means of
avoiding adverse selection and moral hazard problems). A fairly common form of cheating at roulette tables in gambling casinos is attempting by sleight-of-hand to increase the
size of one's bet after one's number, or color, has come up a winner. See Peter G. Demos,
Jr., Roulette Game Protection, in KATHRYN HASHIMOTO ET AL., CASINO MANAGEMENT: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 117 (2d ed. 1998).
37
In commercial insurance policies, deductibles and co-insurance provisions allow
insureds to bear some of the risk of loss in exchange for corresponding reductions in
premiums. See ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 2.
38 The modifier "relatively" is important here. Based on the author's own observation, at the time of this writing, a products liability claim in major East Coast cities must
have an expected value-the probability of success times the recovery if successful--of
several hundred thousand dollars to attract a top-flight plaintiff's law firm.
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Remarkable Examples of EL in American Law

1. Judicially CreatedEL: Abnormally DangerousActivities
Since the House of Lords first recognized this version of EL in
England in the mid-nineteenth century,3 9 a number ofjurisdictions in
this country have followed suit.40 Indeed, the American Law Institute

included the rule of strict liability for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities in its Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1965.41
Both the Restatement and the decisions that follow its rule make clear
that liability is strict and that one who engages in an abnormally dangerous activity is an insurer against harm to persons or property
caused by that activity.4 2 Although formal statements of the rule do
not explicitly require that the activity be carried on commercially,
every reported decision applying the rule involves a commercial defendant. 43 Courts apply a checklist of factors in selecting commercial
activities and enterprises for strict-liability treatment.44 Whether a
given commercial activity is "abnormally dangerous" is not decided on
a case-by-case basis by triers of fact. 45 Such a piecemeal approach to

establishing boundaries would clearly threaten the viability of the EL
system. Instead, courts define the categories that satisfy the criteria, as
a matter of law, with relatively crisp, delineated boundaries. 46 This
assures necessary stability and predictability, allowing the affected en39

See Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).

See, e.g., Chavez v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (E.D. Cal. 1976);
Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 919 (Wash.), amended by 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash.
1991).
41
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1965).
42
Id. § 519 ("One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability... although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm."); see also Siegler v.
Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Wash. 1972) (discussing the application of the rule of
strict liability to abnormally dangerous activity).
43 See supra notes 40, 42.
44
See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 520 (1965):
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
45 See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A-2d 298, 313 (NJ. 1983) (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing in favor of "abnormally dangerous" approach in place of
"design defect" approach, and observing that "[i]t is important to note that the risk-utility
analysis is not submitted to the jury for the purpose of determining absolute liability").
46 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. 1 (1965) (stating that determination of which activities qualify is a legislative-type decision for the courts to make as a
matter of law).
40
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terprises to maintain the requisite pools of insurance. And it allows
accident victims to sort themselves out after the accidental injury, reducing transaction costs of claims processing.
The causation triggers that replace findings of fault in determining the validity of claims against enterprises engaged in abnormally
dangerous activities conform to the prerequisites described earlier.
Courts require a cause-in-fact connection between defendant's activity
and plaintiff's harm. When it is clear that no activity by defendant was
a but-for condition to the plaintiffs harm, the court must deny the
plaintiff's claim as a matter of law, 47 and plaintiff must establish proximate cause. The defendant enterprise is liable without fault only for
"the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous" in the first place. 4 8 For example, assuming that
courts have deemed hauling explosives by truck an abnormally dangerous activity, the enterprise engaged in such hauling is not strictly
liable for all the harm its trucks actually cause while hauling explosives-minor fender-benders that do not involve explosions, for example, are not covered by EL insurance. Instead, only those harms that
the explosive qualities of the cargo cause implicate EL. 49 And even

when an explosion occurs, the hauling enterprise will not be liable for
harm caused to persons miles away who may be upset by the distant
rumblings produced by such an event. 50
What of the third requirement that adequate safeguards protect
the EL insurance scheme against adverse selection and moral hazard?
As with the first two conditions, this traditional version of judicially
created EL adequately satisfies this third condition. Thus, the victims
of commercial activities that courts have traditionally held to be abnormally dangerous-for example, persons harmed when dynamite
blasting hurls rocks onto their houses or their heads-are almost always passive bystanders.5 1 And courts describe the losses for which the
47 See, e.g., Lentz v. Mason, 961 F. Supp. 709, 719 (D.NJ. 1997) ("Plaintiff has cited no
cases imposing strict tort liability for ultrahazardous activity on a party who is not even
alleged to have been connected with the... activity.... [The parties'] connection to the
alleged harmful conduct is too remote to support liability as a matter of law.").
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(2) (1965).
49
Id. § 519 cmt. e.
50 See, e.g., Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645, 648 (Wash. 1954) ("The relatively
moderate vibration and noise which appellant's blasting produced at a distance of two and
a quarter miles was no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the community.");
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524A (1965) (providing examples of harm
caused due to "abnormally sensitive activity" of plaintiffs).
51 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNcrIONS OF TORT LAW 170 (1997) ("To
the extent that an [ultrahazardous] activity.., is uncommon, those who are its potential
victims are unlikely to... be in a position to do much to protect themselves against the risk
the activity poses."); William K. Jones, Strict Liability for HazardousEnterprise, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1705, 1714 (1992) ("[It is difficult to imagine what precautions an ordinary person
might take to guard against the harms inflicted by high explosives, radioactive emissions,

HeinOnline -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 968 2001-2002

2002]

ECHOES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

enterprises are liable in terms that limit the enterprise's exposure
when it appears that victims have either deliberately placed themselves in harm's way or refused to adopt reasonable safeguards against
injury.52 The instrumentalities that cause injury are typically within

the exclusive control of the enterprise; when they are not, primary or
exclusive responsibility for losses tends to fall on those outside the
enterprise who exercise control.5 3 And finally, the expected values of
the losses covered by this version of EL are typically quite high. Indeed, the description of activities that are abnormally dangerous includes a requirement that the activity be likely to cause harms that are
54

great.

One can appreciate how EL systems for abnormally dangerous
activities satisfy the conditions for viability by briefly considering the
potential viability of a hypothetical system imposing EL on the commercial suppliers of the instrumentalities used in the activities. One
example would be the sellers of the trucks and explosives used in the
hauling-explosives hypothetical. If the definition of the sales-based
enterprises were simply "commercial sellers of trucks and explosives,"
one could question why the sellers of other types of vehicles and dangerous cargoes were not included.5 5 At the same time, if the definiion were to include all motor vehicles, how would the issue of
proximate causation be resolved? The foreseeable risks created by
selling motor vehicles do include the fender-benders properly excluded from the hauling-explosives example. 56 And what would prevent adverse selection and moral hazard from destroying the
insurance component of such an EL system? Presumably, the purchaser of a truck used round-the-clock to haul dangerous explosives in
a large city would pay the same insurance premium as a farmer who
purchased the same truck and used it once a week to haul eggs to

bursting reservoirs, oil well 'blow outs,' or conflagrations of large accumulations of combustibles."). The plaintiffs in all of the cases cited in this discussion were bystander victims.
52
See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 523-24 (1965).
53 See, e.g., Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., 766 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1985). See generally
1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL, MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY § 6:2 (3d ed. 2000)
("The plaintiff's abnormally dangerous activities cause of action will fail in the absence of a
showing that the defendant directly controlled the activity.").
54 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(b) (1965).
55 The abnormaly-dangerous-activities-doctrine includes a variety of dangerous cargoes. See 1 OWEN ET AL., supra note 53, § 6:10.
56 Explosives, by their nature, imply a limited range of accidents unique to their use
and handling. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Motor vehicles also imply similar
limits. Running on foot into a parked truck, for instance, would not implicate strict liability, but a much wider range of automobile accidents than those involving explosives, including minor accidents, implicate strict liability.
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market. 57 If both pay the same premiums, how could egg farmers ever
afford to buy new trucks?58 Even within the class of purchasers of
trucks used to haul explosives, who presumably would pay the same
premiums, some would run careful operations and others, careless operations. Clearly, the traditional abnormally-dangerous-activity version of EL maintains viability by imposing strict liability on the users of
trucks to haul explosives rather than the suppliers of trucks and/or
explosives. Truck users create and control the relevant risks of harm,
not truck suppliers; EL-based insurance must focus on those who cre59
ate and control the relevant risks.
2.

Legislatively Created EL: Workers' Compensation

In the first half of the twentieth century, legislatures in every
American jurisdiction enacted statutes that required commercial employers to establish insurance-based EL systems covering their employees for all work-related accidental injuries. 60 These compensation
systems replace fault-based tort; 61 claimants receive benefits according

to established schedules that do not include intangible, noneconomic
losses such as pain and suffering. 62 Administrative proceedings address claims, which reach court only in unusual cases. 63 These statutory EL systems describe the types of employers covered with precision
sufficient to all but eliminate disputes regarding that aspect of coverage. 64 The causation triggers rely on straightforward time-and-space
57 The problem is that price discrimination-charging haulers of explosives more for
trucks than one charges haulers of eggs-is not feasible because the seller cannot control
the activity in which any given truck is engaged after purchase.
58 "Truck insurance" packages would significantly overcharge the egg farmers and
would subsidize the explosives transporters, whom the insurance would significantly undercharge. Farmers would be well-advised to turn to horse-drawn wagons to haul their
eggs. Cf supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing the role of risk classification in combating the negative effects of adverse selection).
59 For a useful discussion of this point, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1321-22 (1991).
60

See generallyJAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. Er AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 722-24 (5th ed.

1999) (discussing the growth of workers' compensation statutes).
61
Id. at 723.
62 See id.
63 For example, in Massachusetts, workers' compensation claims reach court only if
one of the parties appeals the decision of the compensation board. The superior court
then has limited review powers over the board's decision, in that it can examine questions
of law, but cannot alter findings of fact. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & RIcHARD N. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 847-49 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing Massachusetts court interpretation in workers' compensation cases).
64 See id. at 845-50. For example, the Massachusetts statute does not cover professional athletes who are otherwise compensated for work-related injuries, nor does it include real estate brokers who work only on commission. Also excluded are those who are
not employed in the employer's usual course of business. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 152,
§ 1(4) (Law. Co-op. 2000).
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boundaries that cover all accidental harms if they occur at work, even
65
if such harms do not result from risks peculiar to the workplace.
Workers' compensation covers all accidental injuries, even lesser
losses analogous to the "fender-benders" excluded from the hypothetical involving hauling explosives by truck, a commitment rendered
manageable by the scheduling of benefits and administrative claims
processing. For losses that occur outside the workplace, the system
relies on special proximate-causation rules to establish work
66
connection.
The effects of adverse selection and moral hazard on worker compensation insurance pools diminish because coverage is available to
potential claimants only in connection with their full-time employment, assuring risk pools comprising mostly normal, healthy insureds. 6 7 Workers cannot shop among employers for more favorable
terms because those terms are uniform across employers within a
given state. 68 And employers presumably screen, at the time of hiring,
unhealthy, accident-prone job applicants who might seek employment
primarily in order to receive coverage. 6 9 To limit moral hazard in the
form of workers failing to act reasonably to protect themselves and
their fellow workers from injury, every worker compensation system
excludes intentionally self-inflicted injuries.70 And the reality that employers control their workplaces presumably constrains other behavioral aberrations by covered employees that might threaten the
insurance pools.
As with the court-made EL systems based on abnormally dangerous activities, it is revealing to consider whether a statutory EL system
covering workplace injuries could remain viable if it were to shift responsibility for maintaining insurance from employers to the commercial enterprises that supply the dangerous equipment and machinery
In Massachusetts, as in most other states, the injury must be "arising out of and in
65
the course of [the] employment." Id. § 26.
66
See, e.g., Thornton v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 300 A.2d 146 (N.J. 1973) (ordering
compensation for claimant attacked by former co-employee motivated by on-the-job dispute, although attack occurred off employment premises and nine days after claimant left

employment).
67
This built-in assurance of having a normal risk pool is reflected in group insurance,
for which pre-coverage screening is typically minimal. See generallyJOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAw IN A NUTSHELL 14-22 (1st ed. 1981) (discussing the nature and types of group
insurance).
68
See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 723-24.
69
In any event, the employer-insurer controls the hiring of employees and presumably will invest optimally in this regard. Cf ABRAHAM, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing protective measures taken by insurers).
70
Under the Massachusetts statute, compensation is not paid if the employee's "serious and willful misconduct" causes the injury. See MAss ANN.LANs. ch. 152, § 27 (Law. Coop. 2000).
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involved in workplace accidents. 7 ' Defining manageable boundaries
would be difficult. Would the system include suppliers of all machinery and equipment to all employers, or only suppliers of productive
machinery to large employers? How would the system determine actual causation when two or more durable goods combine to cause injury? Suppose, for example, that a forklift supplied by one enterprise
bumps into a worker and pushes him into a punch press supplied by
another enterprise. Given that both instrumentalities are but-for
causes of the accident, would both equipment suppliers be responsible in an EL system? By what criteria would the system resolve issues
of proximate causation for accidents that bear no logical connection
to the workplace? Even if courts could work out these difficulties, adverse selection and moral hazard would destroy any such insurance
system for workplace accidents. Dozens of overworked employees
might use any given piece of inherently dangerous equipment supplied to a productive business in round-the-clock shifts, seven days a
week, in a large industrial complex; or a single, well-rested employee
in a mom-and-pop operation might use the same equipment. Charging the same premium in both cases would lead to obvious difficulties.
Differential pricing could not solve these problems because changes
in any given purchaser's operations-including dangerous modifications of the equipment-could occur at any time during the long, use72
ful lives of workplace machinery.
In short, any attempt to shift responsibility for worker compensation-type EL systems from employers to commercial suppliers of
equipment would be doomed to fail, for reasons that closely parallel
those identified earlier in connection with supplier-based EL systems
relating to abnormally dangerous activities. 73 The lesson in both contexts is clear: for any EL system to maintain viability, the enterprise
held liable as an insurer must control the risks insured against, or at
least the risks must not be controllable, after the insurance takes effect, by others outside the insuring enterprise. Returning to an earlier
metaphor, the operator of an honest roulette wheel can stay in business, and perhaps even prosper, by knowing the odds and keeping
aggregate payouts lower than wagers placed, even though the operator cannot control where the ball will land with each spin of the
wheel. 74 But the same operator will surely face crushing losses when

71

See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57.
73 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
74
See VIRGINIA L. GRAHAM & C. IONEscU TULcEA, A BOOK ON CASINO GAMBLING WRITTEN BY A MATHEMATICIAN AND A COMPUTER EXPERT 39-41 (1976) (observing that the house
has a 5.26% advantage when a player bets a single number in roulette).
72
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those placing wagers can control the ball or change the bets to their
75
advantage after the wagers are made and the wheel has been spun.
D. Why So Few Examples of EL Exist in American Liability Law
Given the enthusiasm that American legal academics have shown
in support of EL, 76 one would expect to encounter much of it in today's tort landscape. However, outside of products liability, examples
of EL are relatively rare. Negligence, not EL, dominates the American
tort scene. 7 7 Thus, courts have deemed "abnormally dangerous" only
a relatively small number of commercial activities, 78 and expansion in
the future appears unlikely. The storage, use, and transportation of
explosives and other hazardous substances such as gasoline and toxic
79
chemicals account for most "abnormally dangerous" activities.
Courts have refused to impose strict enterprise liability on large utility
companies that collect and distribute great quantities of water, sewage, natural gas, and electricity posing significant risks to the public.8 0
And courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs to extend strict liability
to commercial enterprises that supply machinery, vehicles, and other
equipment to those who themselves engage in activities deemed abnormally dangerous. 8 '
See Demos, supra note 36, at 117.
See supra note 10.
77
For a historical perspective, see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Centuiy America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981). See also Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liabilityfor Abnormally DangerousActivity: The Negligence Barrier,36 SAN DIEGo L.
REv. 597, 599 (1999) ("Why have courts been so reluctant to embrace [strict liability for
abnormally dangerous activity]? [C]ourts reject strict liability because they conclude that
the negligence system can function effectively in enforcing safety concerns associated with
the activity."); infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (noting areas where courts have
refused to extend strict enterprise liability).
78
See Boston, supranote 77, at 598 ("[S]trict liability for abnormally dangerous activity.., has evolved to the point of near extinction... ."); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century
of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2405, 2407 (2000).
79 See 1 OWEN Er AL., supranote 53, § 6:12 ("Many courts have refused to extend this
principle of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities beyond those associated with
blasting or hazardous chemicals and substances."); see alsoRESTATEMENT (THIW) OF TORTs:
LtAB. FOR PHYsicAL HARm (BAsIc PRINCIPLES) § 20 reporters' note cmt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 2001) ("Indeed, in certain jurisdictions blasting is essentially the only activity that
has been given strict-liability treatment. .. ").
80 See, e.g., Moore v. Sharp Gas Inc., No. 90-504 MMS, 1992 WL 147930, at *2-*3 (D.
Del. June 11, 1992) (holding that the operation of natural gas lines is not an abnormally
dangerous activity); Voelker v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 727 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Md.
1989) (holding that the transmission of electricity via high-voltage power lines is not an
abnormally dangerous activity); Estate of Thompson v. jump River Elec. Coop., 593
N.W.2d 901, 904-06 (WIs. CL App. 1999) (holding that an employee who works with highvoltage electricity is not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity).
81 See, e.g., Cropper v. Rego Distribution Ctr., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-49 (D.
Del. 1982) (holding that the manufacturer of machinery utilized to store and transport
hazardous chemicals is not subject to strict liability even though the purchaser of the machinery utilized it as part of an abnormally dangerous activity); Cavan v. Gen. Motors
75

76
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Courts explain their refusals to extend the boundaries of the abnormally-dangerous-activities concept in mostly doctrinal terms. For
example, the opinions frequently refer to the circumstance that the
defendant's activity, while admittedly quite dangerous, was a daily oc82
currence and constituted common, rather than abnormal, usage.
Beneath the surface of those opinions, of course, lies the reality that
the cases only infrequently satisfy the conditions for insurance viability
described above, especially when those conditions reflect concern for
the negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard. Too often
the defendant enterprises that plaintiffs seek to hold strictly liable as
insurers are not in positions-as are the insureds-to control the risks
of loss that the EL insurance proposed by plaintiffs would cover. Although courts do not speak of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard"
in articulating this concern, their doctrinal explanations often reveal
an intuitive grasp of the underlying problem. Thus, some courts have
denied strict liability because the defendants did not sufficiently control the dangerous activities in question, 83 or did not control the behavior of third persons who came into contact with, and were injured
by, instrumentalities that would be -covered by the EL insurance sys84
tem proposed by plaintiffs.

Regarding statutory EL systems based on the workers' compensation model, again one finds surprisingly few examples. As noted earlier, the workplace is a venue where serious accidents frequently occur
and employers required to operate EL systems are in control of the
relevant variables. Although other suitable environments for EL undoubtedly exist, attempts to export the workers' compensation model
have not, on the whole, been successful. Thus, the American Bar Association conducted a study in the late 1970s inquiring into the feasibility of a legislatively implemented EL system covering adverse
medical outcomes. 8 5 Hospitals and other medical treatment centers
would replace workplaces as the physical environments in which covCorp., 571 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Or. 1977) ("Historically, the strict liability rule ... is applied
when an activity creates an abnormally dangerous condition, or by its nature presents ex-

traordinary risk of harm .... It has no applicability in a products case.").
82
See, e.g., Voelker, 727 F. Supp. at 994 (holding that transmission of electricity is a
daily occurrence and constitutes common usage).
83
See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
imposition of liability because defendant oil company did not participate in operation in
question); Heinrich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1357 (D. Md.
1982) (dismissing strict liability claims against defendant tire company because it did not
maintain or operate the plant at which plaintiff injured himself).
84
See, e.g., Voelker, 727 F. Supp. at 991; Dixon v. Northeast La. Power Coop., Inc., 524
So. 2d 35, 41-42 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that an electric utility was not strictly liable
when decedents were electrocuted because the 32-foot-high CB antenna they were installing contacted a 28-foot-high uninsulated power line).
85
See ABA COMM'N ON MED. PROF'L LIAB., DESIGNATED COMPENSABLE EvENT SYSTEM: A
FEASIBILIrY STUDY (1979).

HeinOnline -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 974 2001-2002

2002]

ECHOES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY

ered accidents occurred, and medical care providers would replace
employers as the entities providing EL insurance. 86 This author
served as legal consultant to the project. As with workers' compensation, drafting problems had more to do with boundaries and causation triggers than with maintaining viability from an insurance
perspective. 87 In the end, the ABA study judged that the proposed EL
system for medical accidents was too problematic to warrant even experimental implementation.8 8
At this time, very few, if any, statutory EL systems based on the
workers' compensation model are extant. Congress established one
such system in the 1970s to cover negative side effects from the federal
vaccine program launched in response to the swine flu epidemic.8 9
Upon reflection, vaccine programs are ideal candidates for EL. 90 Except for claims verification problems in connection with the element
of actual causation, 9 ' the insurance aspects of such a vaccine compen86
For a description of the proposal, see James A. Henderson, Jr., The Boundary
Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD. L. Rzv. 659 (1982).
87 Id. at 662-80.
88 See Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-BasedAdministrativeAlternativeforResolvingMedical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VANn. L. REv. 1365, 1376-77 (1989) (citing ABA COMM'N ON MED.
PROF'L LiA., supra note 85). Johnson et al. note that the ABA's Designated Compensable
Event program was rejected because of "concern that either the costs of such a system
would be excessive or it would be necessary to apply strictly scheduled benefits and that
such guaranteed but limited benefits would be widely perceived as inadequate compensation." 1d. (footnotes omitted). Cf Larry M. Pollack, Medical Maloccurrence Insurance(MMT):
A First-Party, No-Fault Insurance Proposalfor Resolving the Medical Malpractice Controversy, 23
TORT & INS. L.J. 552, 576-78 (1988) (discussing features of the ABA's Designated Compensable Event program and concluding that such a system, if implemented, "would retain all
the current problems of doctor-patient adversity and poor provider cost spreading, magnified by the increased number of claims").
89 See National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, § 2, 90
Stat. 1113 (1976) (amending section 317 of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247b
(1970)); see also Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1361 (Cal. 1996) (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("In 1976, because the threat of excessive tort liability was deterring drug manufacturers from developing a vaccine for swine flu needed to protect
public health, Congress enacted the Swine Flu Act, under which the federal government
assumed the risk of lawsuits arising from injuries associated with the vaccine."). Authorization for the Program expired on August 1, 1977. See Sally-Anne Danner, Note, The Vaccine
Ailment: A Cure to EncourageLitigation-Shy PharmaceuticalCompanies to Manufacture an AIDS
Vaccine, 14 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'Y 67, 75 n.54 (1993). The Swine Flu Immunization
Program can be distinguished from another attempt by Congress to address liability for
unknown side effects resulting from vaccines, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986 (NCVIA). See Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Anne E. Wells, Comment, RegulatingExperimental
ADS Drugs: A Comparison of the United States and France,13 Loy. L. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 393,
416-17 (1990) (describing the NCVIA). That Act "created a federal compensation system
for reactions and lasting injuries caused by seven childhood disease vaccines." Id. at 417.
90 See generally Merrill, supranote 35, at 107-20 (proposing manufacturer liability for
prescription drug injuries).
91 The problem stems from determining whether the claimant's adverse reaction was
caused by the vaccine. See Hanlon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 191 F.3d 1344,
1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming finding of lower court that child's tuberous sclerosis
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sation program are nonproblematic. The risks are measurable ex
ante, and the vaccine recipients are typically passive and do not control the relevant variables that produce adverse side effects. In light of
the potential viability of these statute-based EL programs, it is puzzling
that one encounters them only rarely outside of workers' compensation. Any drafter with an understanding of insurance fundamentals
should be able to make them work. This author believes that the explanation is primarily political. The interests affected on all sides
must be politically important enough to get the legislature's attention.
Once this happens, statutory EL tends to become the proverbial "political football."92 Even workers' compensation, which has been
93
around for a hundred years, reflects this reality.

condition, rather than a tetanus vaccine, was the actual cause of afebrile seizures the child
suffered subsequent to vaccination); Pociask v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 96-569V, 1999 WL 199053, at *16-'20 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 24, 1999) (finding plaintiff
failed to establish that tetanus vaccine was cause-in-fact of her fibromyalgia condition that
occurred five weeks after vaccination); Gurr v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 37 Fed. Cl.
314, 319-20 (1997) (holding parents failed to establish that diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus
vaccine given to infant, who died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome eleven days after vaccination, was either the cause of an injury listed on an injury table for the purposes of the
NCVIA, or was the cause-in-fact of death); infra note 99; see also Derry Ridgway, No-Fault
Vaccine Insurance: Lessonsfrom the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,24 J. HEa.TH
POL. POL'Y & L 59, 63 (1999) (noting the "troublesome aspects of proving that an immunization caused an injury" for certain injuries that do not appear on a table of vaccines,
associated harms, and time periods); Karin Schumacher, Note, Informed Consent: Should It
Be Extended to Vaccinations?, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 89, 110 (1999) (noting that it is precisely because of the difficulty in proving that a vaccination is the cause-in-fact of an injury
that most claimants under the NCVIA choose to claim an injury listed on the Act's injury
table, which entitles the plaintiff to a statutory presumption the vaccine caused that particular injury).
92 The federal swine flu program remains a notable exception. See supra note 89.
93 A number of states have revised their workers' compensation systems in recent
years, surrounded by considerable political controversy. For sources detailing state reform
of workers' compensation, see Michelle Emery, Governors Say Educated Work Force Key, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at B5 (noting that a Maine governor serving during the
1980s led the state through reform of its workers' compensation laws, making Maine "more
attractive to businesses"); Katherine Gregg, Minimum Wage Hike Advances, PROviDENCE J.,
June 22, 2000, at Al (noting that in 2000, the Rhode Island state senate approved a "detailed revision of the state's workers' compensation law" including an increase in the maximum benefit), available at 2000 WL 21735285; Ralph Z. Hallow, Racicot Withdraws Under
Fire,WASH. TiMES, Dec. 21, 2000, atAl (noting that the governor of Montana had reformed
state workers' compensation laws); and Rachanee Srisavasdi, Disability Payments Could Be
Increased, ORANGE Courrv REG., Apr. 10, 2000 (Supp.), at 5 (noting that California reformed its workers' compensation scheme in 1993 to "cut costs of the then $8.7 billion
system").

Such reforms have often come under public and political scrutiny, not only by probusiness lawmakers who contend that existing systems are overly protective of workers and
too costly, but also by workers' rights advocates who contend that reforms and current laws
often fail to adequately protect workers. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform,"50 RUTGERS L. Rav. 657, 662 (1998) (criticizing the
efficiency rationale and widespread perception that workers' compensation costs had
reached "crisis levels" during the 1980s and 1990s that are cited by most states to justify
widespread enactment of "substantial restrictions" on benefits for injured workers); Emily
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From this brief comparison of traditional court-made and statutebased EL systems in this country, an interesting but frustrating conclusion seems unavoidable. Court-made EL systems tend to avoid political obstacles, but are likely to be unworkable; statute-based EL
systems, in contrast, can be made workable but tend to be unacceptable politically. The bottom line is this: at the practical level, EL plays
a decidedly minor role in American liability law.

THE RoE OF

II
EL Ir MAINSTREAM AMERICAN

PRODUCrS LiABLrTy

A. Where Products Liability and EL Come Together:
Manufacturing Defects and Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts
Since the early 1960s and even before, American courts have held
product manufacturers and other commercial distributors strictly liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects. 94 Because the test for
defects is mechanical-a physical departure from the product unit's
intended design 95-and because the liability is strict and does not require proof of negligence, liability for harm caused by manufacturing
defects constitutes an EL-based insurance system in the truest sense. 9 6
The drafters of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts clearly
had manufacturing defects in mind when they committed-or
A. Spieler, Injured Workers, Workers' Compensation, and Work: New Perspectives on the Workers'
Compensation Debate in West Vrginia, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 333, 354-62 (1992-93) (detailing
how the rising cost of workers' compensation has increasingly intensified the "political
disputes" regarding workers' compensation in "many states," and in West Virginia in particular); Patrick Crowley, Patton Will Address Lawmakers: Session May Take Up Workers' Comp,
CINciNNATi ENQUIRER, Dec. 26, 2000 (detailing Kentucky governor's attempts to shore up
support from coal miners angered by the governor's success at implementing "major" reform of workers' compensation laws in 1996), available at http://enquirer.com/editions/
2000/12/26/loc._pattonvil -address.html (last visitedJan. 28, 2002); Bob Mellow, Editorial, GOP Using Rules to Thwart Will of People, YORK DAILY REc., May 21, 2000, at 3 (noting
that the Republican-dominated Rules Committee of the Pennsylvania state senate successfilly "stifled" debate there regarding changes to Pennsylvania's workers' compensation

law).
94 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (holding manufacturer of defective combination power tool strictly liable for injuries to plaintiff). See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSrs, PRODUCTS LAIIUT.
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 81-91 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the development of strict liability
in the context of manufacturer defects).
95
See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. Lure. § 2(a) (1998); 1 OWEN ET AL.,
supra note 53, § 7:1.
96 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. A purist might insist that courts and commentators use the phrase "enterprise liability" only when the entirety of an enterprise's
commercial activities triggers strict liability. But one may use "enterprise" more discretely,
as long as one maintains the proper boundaries.
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thought they were committing-the future of American products liability law to the principles of EL.9 7 Failure by the drafters to anticipate
the subsequent rise to dominance of product design and warning litigation, which clearly is not compatible with EL, doomed their sweeping commitment to failure.9 8 But it remains true to this day that
liability for manufacturing defects in every American jurisdiction represents one of the clearest examples of EL ever established by judgemade law.
That strict liability for manufacturing defects satisfies the conditions for viability is clear on a brief review. The boundaries are crisp
and do not rely on a vague standard of reasonableness. Neither aspect of causation is particularly problematic. None of the "edges of
science" issues from toxic-substances litigation are involved, 99 and the
"results within the risk" proximate causation issue receives firm guidance from the defect concept.1 00 Regarding the viability of EL insurance for manufacturing defects, several features combine to place
control of the relevant risks in the hands of product distributors.
Most importantly, the defect that eventually causes harm must have
been present at the original time of distribution-and release of control-by the defendant.' 0 ' Commercial distributors are not strictly liable for physical defects that occur after distribution, 0 2 and courts
deny recovery to plaintiffs who discover defects and proceed to use or
consume the defective products.' 0 3 With respect to manufacturing
defects, the purchase of a new product unit resembles the placement
of a wager on a roulette wheel. No one knows whether the particular
unit contains a defect, but the manufacturer knows the odds almost
exactly. Once the wheel is spun, no player may deliberately affect the
outcome. When a purchaser's number comes up-when an original
defect causes accidental harm-an insurance payout is due.10 4 Courts
and commentators from the very start have understood the insurance

See Priest, supra note 7, at 505.
98 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1515 (1992).
99 See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-601 (1993).
100 See generally HENDERSON & TwERsKi, supra note 94, at 207-15 (discussing proximate
97

causation and reasonably foreseeable harm in manufacturer defect context).
101 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LLAB. § 2 cmt. C (1998) (plaintiff bears
burden of establishing that manufacturing defect existed when product left manufac-

turer's hands).
102 A growing number of courts recognize post-distribution duties that sound in negligence. See id. §§ 10-11; see also HENDERSON & TWERSKi, supra note 94, at 375-81 (discussing
recent cases holding that post-sale failure-to-warn cases are govemed by the negligence
theory).
103

See RESTATEMENT

104

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. n (1965).
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implications of this form of strict liability, and have explained andjus1 05
tified it in these terms.
B.

Where EL Has No Logical Relevance: Liability for Failure to
Warn

Product manufacturers are liable for harm caused by their negligent failures to warn about hidden risks whenever an adequate warning would have reduced those risks by inducing the purchaser either
to decide not to purchase the product or to use or consume the product more carefully.'1 6 The inherent incompatibility between the failure-to-warn concept and EL is obvious when one considers the
problems with drawing adequate boundaries. Since the beginning,
courts have connected the phrase "failure to warn" with fault.107 A
manufacturer fails to warn when it fails to act reasonably in communicating information concerning product-related risks. 10 8 A few courts
have considered attributing to manufacturers time-of-trial knowledge
of risks that were scientifically unknowable at the time of distribution. 10 9 But the majority of courts reject this approach, treating product manufacturers' liability for failure to warn, including actual and
proximate causation, as part of negligence law. 110
This decision to treat failure to warn as a part of negligence-based
liability is not simply a function of using "failure to warn" terminology.
Once courts single out the manufacturer's failure to provide useful
and needed information about product risk as a ground for liability
separate and independent from the brute fact that the product caused
plaintiff's harm, they can treat such failure only under the negligence
rubric."' As has been observed, one form of strict liability would impose liability for risks that were scientifically unknowable at the time
of distribution. But no system could insure against such risks. For an
insurance system to function-for the manufacturer to charge the appropriate premiums at the time the manufacturer distributes the
product-the manufacturer must be able to ascertain the covered
See supra note 14.
See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiB. §§ 1, 2(c) (1998).
107
See M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism,
89 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 222 (1987); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design orDirections for Use of a Product, 71 YALs LJ. 816, 817 (1962).
108
See, e.g., Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) ("In practice, the
courts [purporting to apply strict liability] slip back into the type of analyses virtually identical to those employed in negligence cases. Inevitably the conduct of the defendant in a
failure to warn case becomes the issue." (citations omitted)).
109 See cases cited supra note 3.
110 See cases cited supra note 4.
111 If one did not single out failure to warn, all that would be left would be the sort of
design-based claim considered in the next section. See infra Part II.C.
105
106
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risks. 112 Returning to an earlier metaphor, the operator of a roulette
wheel cannot commit to a schedule of payouts without knowing the
odds before each spin. Moreover, not mentioned earlier, for insurance to function properly, the losses insured against must not be
highly correlated-it must not be possible, or at least not very likely,
that most or all insureds will suffer covered losses at the same time.
Similarly, most property loss insurance contracts exclude losses caused
by earthquakes, floods, power failures, war, and nuclear hazards for
this reason.' 13 In the case of roulette, there must be house rules limiting how much can be wagered at one time on a single number.1 1 4
Scientifically unknowable risks tend to be toxic or pharmaceutical,
and have the potential of harming multitudes of victims at once. To
impose strict liability on manufacturers for failing to warn of scientifically unknowable risks would obligate them to insure against highly
correlated losses, the occurrence probabilities of which they cannot
ascertain at the time of distribution when they must charge the necessary premiums. It follows that an EL system for manufacturers' failures to warn would be quite unworkable. Fault-based liability is the
only rational option available to the courts.
C.

Somewhere Between EL and Negligence: Liability for
Defective Designs

Conceptually, manufacturers' liability for harm caused by defective product designs combines features of both strict liability for manufacturing defects and fault-based liability for failure to warn. On the
one hand, like manufacturing defects, design defects relate to the tangible aspects of the product itself; marketing defects in contrast, relate
to the intangible element of risk information. On the other hand,
like warning defects, design defects involve generic hazards shared by
every unit in the product line. Given the mechanical similarities between manufacturing and design defects, courts and commentators
find it easier than with warnings to talk of "strict liability for defective
design." However, as is clear from a careful examination of the holdings, most courts hold manufacturers liable for their designs not as
part of a strict EL system but on the basis of the manufacturers' negligence.1 1 5 Not surprisingly, this judicial response reflects the conditions, identified in previous discussions, that are necessary for an EL
See supra text preceding note 26.
See ABRA-mt, supra note 25, at 223.
See GRAHAM & TULC.A, supra note 74, at 41 (explaining that even though many
casinos limit roulette bets to $500 or $1000, the maximum amount that can be wagered on
a single number is often a much lower figure, typically in the range of $25).
112

113
114

115

See RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF

TORTS: PRODS. LAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998) ("Assessment of

a product design in most instances requires a comparison between an alternative design
and the product design that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of a reason-
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system to maintain viability. Regarding the drawing of workable
boundaries, the only rational boundary for an EL system covering
product designs would be an inclusive "all commercially distributed
product designs that cause harm" formulation. Narrower, less-inclusive formulations that avoid explicit reliance on notions of reasonable
safety, such as "product designs that malfunction,"' 16 "product designs
that violate regulatory safety standards,""17 and "product designs that
18
fail to conform to factual representations or express warranties,""
constitute rational alternatives. But the first two are better dealt with
conceptually as part of the fault-based system for defective design, 119
while one may consider the latter contractual rather than tortbased. 120 Upon reflection, if courts replace the existing fault-based
system for harm caused by product designs with a rationally conceived
EL system, the EL system would necessarily involve holding commercial distributors liable in tort for the harm their product designs-that
is, their products-cause.
That such an EL system covering harm caused by commercially
distributed products would not be viable is clear from previous discussions. To begin with, issues involving causation would defy sensible
resolution. All product-related accidents are caused by more than one
product in the but-for, cause-in-fact sense. 12 1 Returning to an exam12 2
ple relied on in an earlier discussion of workers' compensation,
suppose that the worksite operator of the runaway forklift lost control
because she was intoxicated from having consumed liquor from a hip
flask, and that a co-worker struck by the forklift tripped over a trash
receptacle before falling head-first into a punch press. Assume further that all of these products were necessary conditions to the second
worker suffering injury, and that the injured worker seeks recovery
under the EL system against the distributor of each product. Which
of the products actually caused the plaintiff's harm? It would appear
that all of them-forklift, liquor, hip flask, trash receptacle, and
able person. That approach is also used in administering the traditional reasonableness
standard in negligence.").
116 See id. §3.
117 See id. §4.
118

See id. §9.

119 The malfunction rule is analogous to res ipsa loquitur from negligence, see id. § 3
cmt. a, and violation of safety regulation is analogous to per se negligence, see id. § 4 cmt.
d.
120 Breach of express warranty, like misrepresentation, involves the failure of defendant's design to conform to affirmations in defendant's distribution contract. See id. § 9
cmt. e.
121 Again, the EL system here does not require a product defect. Thus, if a consumer
injures herself when she falls off a chair, the table at which she was sitting in order to drink
beer would be a but-for cause of her harm, as would the beer itself.
122
See supra text following note 73.
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punch press-were but-for causes of the harm. 123 Does it follow that
the manufacturers of all of these products are jointly and severally
liable to the plaintiff? If so, what about the manufacturers of the delivery trucks that originally delivered these products to the
124
workplace?
Readers may react to these questions by asking some of their own:
"Was anything wrong with any of these products? Why not determine
which of them proximately-as opposed to actually-caused plaintiff's harm?" Regarding whether anything was wrong with the products, one should bear in mind that the type of EL we are considering
here, covering all generic product risks, does not purport to rely on
whether they are defective in any way. Causation, not defect, is the
liability trigger in EL for generic product risk, and in the forklift hypothetical, actual causation flounders badly as a criterion for determining the application of such a system of EL. What about relying on
proximate causation to sort things out? That concept also flounders
because, without the linchpin of defect as a normative guide, it begs
all of the important questions.1 25 All commercially distributed products are included in the EL system because all of them have the potential to cause harm, which is exactly what all of them did in the fork-lift
hypothetical-they caused harm. Perhaps only abnormally dangerous
products should be included in the EL system. That adjustment, however, would not only raise serious boundary problems, 126 but would
also beg the substantive question of which products are abnormally
dangerous. In connection with the hypothetical, forklifts and punch
presses would clearly qualify as abnormally dangerous, but so, arguably, would liquor and workplace trash receptacles. 127 And certainly
the trucks that delivered those products to the workplace would qualify as abnormally dangerous, would they not? On any view, the unworkability of the causation trigger in a product design EL system
would seriously threaten its viability.
Even if one could somehow resolve causation problems, manufacturers under such an EL regime could not hope to operate viable insurance systems covering losses caused by their products. Unlike the
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
This possibility is not as much of a stretch as it may at first appear. Trucks hauling
explosives would clearly be but-for causes of an in-transit explosion. Equally clearly, once
one expurgates completely the notion of product defect, trucks that deliver explosives that
exploded thirty minutes later would also be but-for causes of the explosion in the "brute
sense."
125 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 59, at 1267 (introducing idea of defect concept as "linchpin").
126 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
127 Liquor would certainly be high on anyone's "ten most wanted" list. And one could
characterize anything intended to be on the floor around workplace machinery, at least in
terms of its potential for causing harm, as a dangerous tripping device.
123
124
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game of roulette, which does not allow players to increase their
chances of winning or the amounts of their wagers after the wheel has
been spun, here product users, consumers, and victims could deliberately affect both variables with substantial impunity. Even if defenses
such as contributory fault, product misuse, product modification, and
the like were available to defendants, 128 such rules could never adequately accommodate the variety of post-distribution product uses and
modes of consumption that could dramatically affect an enterprise's
exposure under EL. Adverse selection and moral hazard would surely
combine to destroy the integrity of an EL system for all productcaused harms.
In order to appreciate the hopelessness of trying to operate a
broad EL system for harm caused by product designs, it is useful to
reflect briefly on why the existing fault-based system of liability for defective designs works comparatively well. The major reason, of course,
is that the traditional fault-based concept of design defect places the
lion's share of responsibility for avoiding design-related losses on
those who control the relevant risks: individuals who use, consume,
and are otherwise affected by commercially distributed products. The
fault-based concept of design defect identifies the limited aspects of
product use and consumption that manufacturers can and should
control through their designs. Clearly, manufacturers can reduce
some risks associated with post-distribution use and consumption.
Momentary lapses in user attentiveness, for example, effectively can
be reduced by adjusting product designs ahead of time, and manufacturers must exercise reasonable care to make such adjustments. 12 9
But accident victims or those who negligently cause harm to the victims through product-related behavior must bear responsibility for
30
most of the harm caused by the use and consumption of products.'
Scholars may dream of a world in which design-based EL is viable; but
in the meantime all of us must live in the world we have.

128 See HENDERSON & TWERSai, supra note 94, at 633-36 (discussing affirmative defenses
to design defect liability).
129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LLmB. § 2 Cult. 1 (1998) ("In general,
when a safer design can reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed
out of a product, adoption of the safer design is required .... [I] nstructions and warnings
may be ineffective because users of the product ... may be likely to be inattentive .... .").
130 Again, one may inadvertently read the text to be saying that victims or users of
defective products must bear the losses. That is not what the text is saying, however. Rather,
it is making the much more obvious and noncontroversial point that when an over-tired
driver falls asleep at the wheel of a nondefective automobile and crashes, a court cannot,
and should not, hold the automobile manufacturer responsible for the driver's injuries.
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III
ECHOES OF

EL

IN PRODUCT DESIGN AND

WARNING LITIGATION

A.

Identifying the Relevant Paradigm: The Roulette Wheel
Revisited

This Part describes unique factual circumstances, arising from
time to time in product design and warning litigation, that tempt
courts to depart from mainstream negligence principles and to impose pockets of strict EL in the midst of an otherwise unbroken expanse of fault-based liability. As might be expected, these are cases in
which courts that are otherwise firmly committed to the traditional
requirement that plaintiff establish a defect in design or marketing
confront what they intuitively perceive to be roulette-wheel situations
functionally similar to those involving manufacturing defects, in response to which courts routinely and properly impose strict EL.1 31
But the following cases involve allegedly defective designs and failures
to warn. In these cases, courts appear to appreciate the existence of
roulette-wheel circumstances and respond by stretching existing doctrine and imposing what functionally amounts to strict EL. Rather
than breaking openly with orthodoxy, a possibility considered in the
next Part, courts extend existing doctrine beyond the normal limits,
insisting all the while that they are engaged in "business as usual."
And yet the stretches are sufficiently great as to be unmistakable to an
informed observer. Moreover, even those who, like this author, prefer
courts generally to follow existing law are not likely to be greatly offended by these stretches because, instinctively, the stretches resonate
132
with the deeper themes identified in this Article.
B.

Echoes of EL in Product Design Litigation

A good example of the phenomena here being examined is the
California Court of Appeal's decision in Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp.1 33
The plaintiff in that case suffered serious injuries to her elbow when,
momentarily distracted while driving her automobile at relatively low
speed, she rear-ended the vehicle in front of her. The driver-side
airbag deployed, pushing her left arm violently into the windshield's
side pillar.1 34 Plaintiff claimed that the airbag was defective in design
because it disappointed reasonable consumer expectations by causing,
131
132

See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
To those who object to what courts have done in these cases, the "stretches" will be
seen as "distortions."
133 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1995).
134 Id. at 448.
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instead of preventing, serious injury.13 5 The trial court dismissed on

the ground that the consumer expectations test was not available because airbags involve "new technology" about which consumers are
unable to form expectations of safety. 13 6 The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for trial, ruling that even if defendant's airbag
design was as safe as it could possibly be, the disappointment of condeployment would sufsumer expectations resulting from its13harmful
7
fice to support design-based liability.
The Court of Appeal's holding in Bresnahanis clearly inconsistent
with prior decisions of the Supreme Court of California. The leading
decision, which Bresnahanpurports to follow and apply, 138 limits application of the consumer expectations test to cases in which a product
design malfunctions-dangerously fails to perform as it was manifestly
intended to function. 13 9 In Bresnahan,the airbag clearly performed as
its manufacturers intended. 40 Moreover, when a product malfunctions, quite obviously it could have been designed to be safer, a circumstance that Bresnahan prevents the defendant from even
attempting to negate on remand. 14 1 Not surprisingly, a subsequent
airbag decision on similar facts by a different division of the California
Court of Appeal pointedly declined to follow Bresnahan's interpretation of the consumer expectations test.' 4 2 So it is reasonable to conclude that Bresnahan's application of existing California law
43
constitutes reversible error.'
The point here is not to criticize Bresnahandoctrinally, but to observe that the court's decision is at least understandable in offering a
strict EL response to a roulette-wheel fact pattern. Drivers of automobiles are quite reasonable in allowing-indeed, in desiring-airbags
135 Id. at 449. Plaintiff's counsel insisted that he would establish "that the ordinary
consumer would not expect this touted safety device to cause this type of injury." Id.
136

Id. at 448-50.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 451-52.
139 See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 n.3 (Cal. 1994) ("For example,
the ordinary consumers of modem automobiles may and do expect that such vehicles will
be designed so as not to explode while idling at stoplights, experience sudden steering or
brake failure as they leave the dealership, or roll over and catch fire in two-mile-per-hour
collisions."); cf supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the rule for product
malfunctions).
140 Airbags deploy at the relatively low speed involved in Bresnahan because deploy.
ment helps much more than it hurts at those speeds in most cases. See infra note 145.
141 See Bresnahan, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452 ("Risk-benefit weighing is not a formal part of,
nor may it serve as a 'defense' to, the consumer expectations test.").
142 See Pruitt v. Gen. Motors Corp., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 7 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
"[t]he discussion of the consumer expectations test in... Bresnahan" "conflicts with our
Supreme Court's discussion of the applicability of the test in Soule").
143 See HENDERSON & TWERsai, supra note 94, at 515 ("Needless to say, the authors
believe that the court in Pruittgot it absolutely right.").
'37

138
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in their vehicles.' 4 4 In general, airbags prevent many more injuries
than they cause. 1 45 And while drivers obviously control how they drive
as a general matter, the type of momentary inadvertence involved in
Bresnahan does not constitute deliberate risk-taking and is certain to
46
recur frequently and randomly in the course of normal driving.'
The odds of being seriously injured by low-speed airbag deployment
are small, 1 47 and obviously the injuries sustained when the driver is
mis-positioned can be serious enough to warrant a lawyer's pursuing
recovery on a contingent fee arrangement. Finally, the causation issue is typically straightforward enough not to give courts independent
148
reason to hesitate.
When one reflects upon the relevant trade-offs, injuries caused by
low-speed airbag deployment are analogous not only to injuries
caused by manufacturing defects but also to injuries caused by vaccines dispensed in mass immunizationprograms. In all of these examples, a few users or consumers suffer serious harm passively, through
no real fault of their own, while using and consuming products in
ways that benefit many more users and consumers, often by saving
them from serious injury. Strict EL is imposed by courts in connection with manufacturing defects' 49 and by the federal legislature in
connection with at least one publicly administered vaccine. 150 So why
See supra note 139.
See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFic SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., THIRD REPORT
To CONGRESS: EFFEcrIVENESS OF OccuPANT PROTECrION SYSTEMS AND THEIR USE iv (1996).
144
145

In that report, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration noted:
[A] ir bags may involve a trade off among certain types of injury. The addition of an air bag to the lap-shoulder belt user increases head injury protection and chest injury protection (at the moderate and serious injury levels),
while at the same time increasing the risk of moderate and serious arm
injury. However, injuries to the head and chest pose much greater lifethreatening risks than do arm injuries.
Id. at iv; see also Barbara L. Atwell, ProductsLiability and Preemption:A JudicialFramework 39

BuFF. L. REv. 181, 213 n.180 (1991) (noting that Allstate Insurance President Richard
Haayen stated that not only had airbags been determined to be effective by his company's
research and use of them, but that "[t]heir record of preventing or sharply reducing
deaths and serious injuries in more than one billion miles of actual travel is unparalleled in
highway safety annals" (quoting Richard J. Haayen, The Airtight Casefor Air Bags, SATURDAY
EVENING POST, Nov. 1986, at 36, 38)); Dana P. Babb, Note, The Deployment of Car Manufacturers into a Sea of Product Liability?RecharacterizingPreemption as a Federal Regulatory Compliance Defense in Airbag Litigation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1677, 1677-78 (1997) (noting that while
airbags prove an expensive but effective safety feature for adults, there is concern about

the propensity of airbags to severely injure or kill children and small adults).
146
See supra note 129.
147
Much more often, drivers' arms will be on the steering wheel and the airbag deployment will cause no serious harm.
148
The one area where conceptual difficulties might arise is in connection with the
"enhancement of injuries" phenomenon in crashworthiness situations. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LLAB. § 16 (1998).
149
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
150

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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not impose EL insurance coverage in connection with low-impact
airbag deployments even if airbag designs are reasonably safe when
judged by traditional standards? By asking this rhetorical question the
author does not mean to imply that the decision in Bresnahanis appropriate when one considers its doctrinal impact on future design litigation. Courts should limit the consumer expectations standard
recognized by the California Court of Appeal in Bresnahan to product
malfunctions, lest very great mischief transpire when they apply it lawlessly in a broader range of design cases. But even a curmudgeon like
this author can look at Bresnahanwith a lessjaundiced eye, appreciating the intuitive power of the roulette-wheel paradigm.
The "very great mischief' that can stem from overly broad application of the consumer expectations test for defective design deserves
brief elaboration. As noted earlier, some observers believe that the
"most are helped while a few get hurt" scenario, epitomized by the
roulette-wheel metaphor, is a useful way of viewing the entire system
of producing and distributing products in a market economy. 15 '
Philosophically, this author has no particular quarrel with that way of
looking at things from a broad perspective. Real problems arise, however, in attempting to translate such a vision into a workable regime of
tort liability. As this Article demonstrates, a comprehensive EL system
covering all generic product hazards would not be viable. Undaunted, some observers, 52 including a minority of courts, 53 have
fixed upon the idea of allowing "disappointment of consumer expectations" to function as a test for design defect even when the narrower
version of the roulette-wheel factual scenario in Bresnahan is absent.
Under such a broad application of the consumer expectations test,
courts would impose design-based liability even when manufacturers
could not have made the designs safer and when manufacturers made
or broke no express warranties. In effect, this hit-or-miss version of EL
based on consumer expectations would provide insurance coverage

151 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., F. Patrick Hubbard, Reasonable Human Expectations: A Normative Model for
Imposing Strict Liability for Defective Products, 29 MERCER L. REv. 465 (1978); Marshall S.
Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of ConsumerProtection:Doctrine,Function and LegalLiabilityfor
Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
153
See, e.g., French v. Grove Mfg. Co., 656 F.2d 295, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding
that an ironworker struck by a crane need not prove the existence of a "feasible and safer
alternative," but must only show that the crane was "unreasonably dangerous" as judged by
the expectation of an ordinary user); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p., 509 N.W.2d 603, 610-11
(Neb. 1994) (holding that an automobile passenger severely injured in a rollover accident
must show that the vehicle's design was unreasonably dangerous, in that it had a "propensity for causing physical harm beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
user or consumer who purchases it," and that "Nebraska no longer requires proof of an
alternative design for a claimant to recover under a claim of defective design").
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selectively and retroactively whenever juries whimsically decide, on the
facts of individual cases, that such coverage is socially appropriate.
The minority of courts that indulge in this overly broad application of the consumer expectations test for defective design are probably not even aware that they are applying a whimsical, hit-or-miss
version of EL. Relying on language taken out of context from a comment to section 402A of the Restatement (Second),15 4 these courts believe that they are applying mainstream concepts of design defect. 155
Some courts even allude vaguely to the circumstance that the manufacturer's advertising is to blame for raising consumer expectations of
safety, although these advertisements involve no express warranties or
factual misrepresentations. 1 56 Given that manufacturers in a market
economy quite understandably try, through advertising, to make their
154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965) ("The article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer .... ").
155
The seminal decision in California, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443,
455-56 (Cal. 1978), upon which the later decision in Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d
298 (Cal. 1994), discussed supra note 139, builds, recognized the consumer expectations
test as an independent standard, along with the negligence standard, for determining the
defectiveness of product designs. Soule later limited application of the consumer expectations test to cases of product malfunction, see supra note 139 and accompanying text, but
for more than fifteen years California courts treated consumer expectations as a mainstream, all-purpose design standard.
156 An example of this whimsical, unworkable version of EL is found in the decision of
the Oregon intermediate court of appeals in McCathern v. Toyota Motor Corp., 985 P.2d 804
(Or. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 23 P.3d 320 (Or. 2001). The plaintiff, injured when a sportutility vehicle rolled over during a high-speed turn, alleged a design defect based on both
the availability to defendant of a safer alternative design and the disappointment of consumer expectations. The trial court entered judgment on a general verdict for plaintiff
and defendant appealed. The appellate court held that plaintiff's proof of a safer design
was sufficient and affirmed plaintiffs judgment. Id. at 817. Regarding plaintiffs second
basis for recovery, the court explained that the manufacturer's advertising may raise consumer expectations of stability, disappointment of which renders the design defective even
if the representations are too vague to constitute express warranties or tortious misrepresentations. See id. at 817-20. In effect, if the defendant promotes its vehicle as safe and
worthwhile, juries may impose strict liability whenever bad things happen. Whatever sympathy this author may have expressed earlier for the California court's misapplication of
the consumer expectations test in Bresnahan, see text accompanying notes 144-50, sympathy for misapplication of that test in McCathernwould clearly be inappropriate. EL cannot
rest on the case-by-case reactions of juries to the hypothesized psychological effects of
product advertising. Under the intermediate appellate court's holding in this case, future
courts can interpret a wide range of aberrant user behavior as part of the manufacturer's
responsibilities as insurer, by merely pointing to advertising that arguably raises expectations. Adverse selection and moral hazard would combine to destroy the integrity of any
EL system based upon the intermediate court's holding in McCathern. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Oregon affirmedjudgment for plaintiff, but held that the representational
version of consumer expectation had no basis in Oregon law. See McCathern v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320, 332 (Or. 2001). For a somewhat more extended critique of the
intermediate appellate court's decision in McCathern,see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REv. 1
(1999).
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products attractive to consumers, imposing strict EL whenever a jury
finds that promotion of a product has raised consumer expectations
requires manufacturers to operate insurance systems covering risks
that the users and consumers control. For the reasons developed in
this analysis, the integrity of such insurance schemes would be compromised from the outset.
C.

Echoes of EL in Failure-to-Warn Litigation

A number of courts confronting the roulette-wheel paradigm and
finding no basis for liability in mainstream doctrine have stretched the
rules governing failure-to-warn to achieve pockets of EL, producing
the "echoes" of interest in this Article. Warnings doctrine is generally
more flexible than design defect doctrine, 157 providing courts with all
the leeway necessary to "do justice" in individual cases.1 58 Thus, when
the mainstream rules do not support intuitively satisfying outcomes in
response to roulette-wheel fact patterns, some courts have recognized
duties to warn about risks that are so widely known, or negligible in
magnitude, that warning of them could never realistically help anyone
to avoid injury. 159 Moreover, given the inherent uselessness of the
warnings required in these cases, together with the potential negative
effects such warnings could have on product marketing, it appears
that manufacturers have responded rationally by choosing not to warn
and simply insuring against their exposures to what they perceive (ac160
curately enough) to be strict EL.
An example of an appellate decision conforming to this pattern is
Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co.,161 in which relatively moderate beer drinking-two or three cans per night, four nights per week, for six yearscaused plaintiffs decedent to die from pancreatitis at a young age.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on
157 See generallyJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell ofFailureto Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 265 (1990) (discussing the
dimensions of the failure-to-warn doctrine that produce excessive liability for

manufacturers).
158 The concept of "informed choice" increases flexibility even further. The seminal
decision is Borel v. FibreboardPaperProducts Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). Cf infra
notes 174-85 and accompanying text (discussing courts' use of the "informed consent"
model to impose strict liability in design and warning cases).
159 In theory, the warning gives the consumer the choice to avoid the risk by not using

or consuming the product. But when the risk is very remote and the benefits of using or
consuming are substantial, the warnings would only affect especially superstitious or excita-

ble persons. Cf infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing how in some cases warning of remote risks will have only limited effect and deter rational use of the product).
Again, almost all reasonable consumers would go ahead and use or consume the
160
product, so why warn and make things unpleasant? Given the remoteness of the risks
involved, punitive damages are out of the picture. The author's empirical evidence in
support of the assertion in the text is anecdotal.
161 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
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the ground that the potentially serious health risks from repeated consumption of alcohol are so widely known as not to require a warning,
and that the particular risk of developing pancreatitis is so extremely
remote as to render a warning useless to those who, like the youthful
decedent, enjoy drinking beer in moderation.1 62 The court of appeals
reversed, reasoning that a jury could find that beer drinkers do not
know about the risk of pancreatitis and that it should be the subject of
a warning. 163 Whether or not liability in this case would make sense
from the perspective of failure-to-warn jurisprudence-this author
thinks it does not-it makes good sense from the standpoint of EL
jurisprudence. The beer drinker in Hon faced a roulette-wheel scenario. Moderate beer consumption is reasonable; the risk of pancreatitis
is remote and consumers cannot control it by the manner in which
they drink beer. The effects, when they occur, are life-threatening.
Covering decedent's loss with strict EL is no more problematic than
doing the same thing with respect to losses caused by manufacturing
defects.
Although it appears obvious that warning consumers of such a
remote risk would have no more effect on rational consumer behavior
than would warning about the risk of manufacturing defects, 164 the
decision of the appeals court in Hon nevertheless makes sense on its
facts. And the same conclusion probably makes sense in connection
with a decision in Washington State in which the court upheld a verdict against the manufacturer of baby products for failing to warn parents of the remote risk of brain damage to their infant from breathing
in a mist of baby oil from an open bottle.' 65 The only likely effect
such a warning would have on consumer behavior would be to
frighten a few parents away from rationally deciding to keep baby oil
in their homes. 166 Neither beer nor baby oil to this day carry the sorts
of warnings that these courts purported to require, based on this author's informal field research. 167 Yet even if every American jurisdiction imposed liability on the same facts, no such warnings would
appear and the manufacturers' exposures to strict liability would be
manageable under the EL principles developed in this Article.
162
See id. at 514-16.
163 Id. at 514.
164 Again, some consumers might choose not to use or consume when reminded of
the remote chance of a defect, but such a reaction would not be rational. See supra note
159 and accompanying text.
165
See Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 797 P.2d 527 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990), affd, 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991).
166 Some parents might choose to keep baby oil in the house, but treat it as if it were
rat poison. Indeed, that apparently is what the parents in Ayers did. See id. at 536 (Reed,J.,
dissenting).
167 1 checked Johnson &Johnson baby oil in Ithaca, NewYork and Coral Gables, Florida, and found no warnings about aspiration.
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What are not manageable, however, are the potentially crushing
liabilities that some judicial decisions impose in cases that, while superficially similar on their facts to the beer and baby oil cases just
described, do not present the roulette-wheel paradigm. Thus, in McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.,168 the plaintiffs were chronic
alcoholics who consumed massive quantities of distilled spirits over
many years. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant liquor distillers
failed to warn them of the details of the drink-induced maladies that
eventually killed them. The Texas trial court dismissed and plaintiffs
appealed. 169 The appellate court reversed, sending the case back for
trial. 170 Although the Supreme Court of Texas thereafter reversed the
intermediate court and reinstated the trial court's dismissal on the
ground that the risks from chronic, abusive drinking are widely known
and thus negate any duty to warn, 171 the intermediate court's decision
is worth considering for its relevance to this analysis. McGuire is distinguishable on its facts from Hon, the beer case, inasmuch as McGuire
did not involve anything even remotely resembling a roulette-wheel
scenario. Problem drinkers are not passive victims, as was the moderate beer drinker in Hon. Liquor distillers cannot effectively control
those who consume their products and cannot price discriminate
against problem drinkers. 172 It follows that stretching failure-to-warn
doctrine to impose strict EL is not even arguably appropriate on the
facts in McGuireand in numerous other decisions in which the abusive
use and consumption of inherently dangerous products brings with it
risks of harm that are widely known and generally understood. 73 In
such cases, manufacturers cannot insure against the risk when the individuals covered by the insurance exert substantial control over the
risks after the manufacturers distribute the products.
It remains to consider a different doctrinal path by which courts
may impose marketing-based strict liability on manufacturers for generic product risks that courts have traditionally handled under negligence. Confronted with a roulette-wheel situation, a court may invoke
the informed-consent model borrowed from medical malpractice
cases. 174 On this view, the consumer's threshold choice of whether to
purchase or consume a product attendant with unavoidable risks of
168 790 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991).
169 See id. at 853.
170 Id.
171 See McGuire, 814 S.W.2d at 388.
172 See, e.g., Russell v. Bishop, No. 88, 1986 WL 653 (Tenn. Ct. App.Jan. 7, 1986) (declining to extend liquor distiller's liability for the negligent acts of alcohol consumers).
173 See generally Henderson & Rachlinski, supra note 24 (concluding that EL for harm
caused by cigarette smoking is not viable).
174 See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958) (articulating the rule that a physician must inform his patients of known alternatives to the proposed treatment when no emergency exists).
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injury is analogous to a patient deciding whether to consent to risky
medical treatment. In the medical context, some courts have treated
the physician's duty to disclose as having less to do with risk-reduction
than with respecting and protecting the dignitary values inhering in
the patient's right to choose. 175 Several tactical advantages accompany judicial reliance on informed choice as a means of imposing
strict EL in roulette-wheel products situations. For one, the relative
triviality of the nondisclosed risk poses less of an obstacle conceptually
because the objective, after all, is not simply to increase safety, but also
to preserve dignity. For essentially the same reason, but-for causation
presents fewer difficulties because even if the consumer would have
consented if told of the risk, the point is that she was not told, and the
manufacturer arguably infringed her dignity interests regardless of
how she might have responded had the manufacturer treated her with
1 76
more respect.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on informed-choice warnings to impose strict liability in Liriano v. Hobart
Corp-' 77 In that case, a young, inexperienced worker lost his arm in an
industrial meat grinder whose safety guard had been forcibly removed
by the employer. Barred by worker compensation from suing the employer in tort, 178 the plaintiff asserted design and warning claims
against the machine manufacturer in federal district court in New
York. On defendant's appeal from a judgment for plaintiff on the
failure-to-warn claim, and after the New York Court of Appeals had
answered a certified question, 179 the federal court of appeals affirmed
the judgment for plaintiff. Judge Guido Calabresi, a prominent lawand-economics theorist who has written extensively about EL, 180 explicitly relied on the informed-choice concept.' 8 ' While the risks of
working with an unguarded grinder were obvious, he reasoned that
the manufacturer should have warned the plaintiff that a guard could
be put back on the machine so that the young man would, at least
theoretically, have had the choice of quitting in protest if his employer refused to replace the guard. 18 2 The facts in Liriano support
two conclusions: first, that the plaintiff, a young immigrant who des175

See, e.g., Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining

the difference between negligence and battery theories in the context of medical
malpractice).
176 See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 60, at 56 (noting that "[u]nder battery, whether
or not the plaintiff would have consented [if warned] is irrelevant").
177 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999).

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700 N.E.2d 303 (N.Y. 1998).
See, e.g., GuiDo CALABR-si, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDEN'rs: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY180
sis (1970).
181 See Liriano, 170 F.3d at 270.
182
See id. at 270-71.
178

179
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perately needed the job and who had been hired "off the books" at
minimum wage,' 83 faced a dangerous roulette-wheel situation by
agreeing to work under those conditions; 8 4 and second, that the
court's talk of informed choice and plaintiff's asking his employer to
replace the guard is largely symbolic, invoked in an attempt to justify
the court's imposition on the manufacturer of what amounts to thinly
185
veiled strict liability.
As with the other design and warning cases in which echoes of EL
are detectable, the Second Circuit's decision in Lirianois clearly open
to criticism from a doctrinal standpoint. At the same time, the outcome is arguably satisfying from the broader perspectives developed
in this analysis. Clearly, the manufacturer of meat grinders cannot
effectively insure against the risks to workers from their employers
grossly disabling built-in safety devices.' 8 6 Indeed, the New York state
court's answer to the certified question in Lirianopartially abrogated a
long-standing rule in New York affording manufacturers a strong defense when post-sale product alterations take place. 8 7 But in Liriano,
under a special New York rule allowing manufacturers to recover full
indemnity from negligent employers, 188 the jury allocated most of the
responsibility for the accident to the employer, so that the manufacturer presumably paid only a very small portion of the judgment. 18 9
To the extent that imposing strict EL on the manufacturer in Liriano
allowed the manufacturer to serve as a conduit through which most of
the liability passed to the employer, the informed-choice concept
served a useful purpose. After all, the worker compensation statute
barred the plaintiff from bringing an action directly against the employer. However, in other jurisdictions that do not allow manufacturers to recover substantial indemnity against employers who
significantly modify workplace machinery, 190 Liriano's imposition of
EL on the manufacturer sets a dubious precedent. On balance, as the
next Part discusses, extending Liriano's informed-choice analysis any
further than that case's unusual factual circumstances would be a mistake. Employed expansively, the informed-choice version of failure-to183 These facts are not mentioned in judge Calabresi's opinion, but were part of the
undisputed proof at trial. The author argued Liiano in the New York Court of Appeals.
184 See supra text accompanying note 36.
185 Given the plaintiff's desperate circumstances-in effect, a wage slave to his employer-receiving a reminder that he could quit in protest over the safety guard's removal
was of absolutely no help to him.
186
See supra notes 59, 128-30 and accompanying text.
187
See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y.
1980).
188
See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
189 See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999).
190 See, e.g., Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp., 585 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (I1. 1991).
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warn doctrine embraces lawlessness in the form of sending every warning claim to the jury.19 1

WHY THESE ECHOES OF

IV
EL WiLL

NOT SUPPORT AN

INDEPENDENT LIABILIy

RULE

The analysis to this point seems to leave matters in an uneasy
state of irreconcilable tension. On the one hand, the judicial impulses giving rise to these doctrinal stretches are understandable, and
sometimes even justifiable, given the roulette-wheel scenarios the
cases present to courts. On the other hand, even if understandable,
these doctrinal extensions threaten to undermine the integrity of
traditional rules of liability for product design and marketing, lessening their capacity to generate sensible, consistent outcomes in the
more usual run of cases. One way to ease these tensions-to relieve
the pressures on traditional doctrine-would be for courts to recognize a new, independent liability rule based explicitly on the roulettewheel paradigm. The factual characteristics of that paradigm are
readily identifiable. Thus, in all of the roulette-wheel cases considered in the preceding analysis, the choice to use or consume the product that ultimately causes harm is manifestly reasonable; for example,
one can hardly fault a consumer for choosing to drive an automobile
192
equipped with an airbag, as in the Bresnahandecision in California.
Moreover, in each case, between the consumer's choice to use or consume the defendant's product and the eventual accident, one cannot
expect either the product user or consumer, or any bystander victim,
to increase the relevant risks deliberately in ways that significantly increase the defendant's exposure to liability.19 3 And in all of these rou191
For the general proposition that sending every claim to the jury would be lawless,
see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 157, at 290 ("Without adequate restraints on the

exercise of unreviewable jury discretion, the liability system drifts into lawlessness."). The
Reporter's note to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LLA6B. § 2 cmL i (1998) explains
that courts have applied informed-choice theory only in cases involving toxics and prescription drugs, where consumers are passive victims of product-related injury. Applying informed-choice doctrine to more complex producer-consumer relationships, such as
imposing a duty to inform a consumer about the crashworthiness of different automobile
models, would add little, if anything, to true informed choice on the part of the consumer
because such warnings would by necessity address numerous issues such as speed, point of
collision, and use of seatbelts, thus rendering the warning hopelessly complex. Use of
informed-choice theory in such scenarios would merely circumvent the restraints of traditional warnings doctrine, thereby enabling otherwise meritless claims to reach the jury.
For a criticism of the Liriano court's use of informed-choice theory, see Hildy Bowbeer &
David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious Dangers,the Duty to Warn of SaferAlternatives, and the Heeding Presumption, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 717, 750 (1999).
192 Bresnahan v. Chrysler Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446 (Ct. App. 1995).
193 For example, one would not normally expect drivers of automobiles to deliberately
increase the probability of airbag deployment at low speed, given the potential for injury.
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lette-wheel cases, at the time the choice to use or consume is made,
the likelihood of an accident of the sort that causes harm is remote
and the magnitude of the harm in the event the accident should occur is great.' 94 Might not these elements combine in a new liability
rule that imposes EL straightforwardly in roulette-wheel cases, without
the need for courts to stretch, and possibly distort, existing products
doctrine?
That a workable rule could not be formulated is clear. As discussed earlier, the first and arguably most important condition that
must be satisfied for an EL-based insurance system to function properly is the establishment of bright-line boundaries that do not require
fact-sensitive determinations on a case-by-case basis.' 95 Courts and the
commercial enterprises affected by EL must be able to determine as a
matter of law which commercial activities will bring liability without
fault. Only if the generalized criteria observed in roulette-wheel cases
will support bright-line categorization ahead of time, as is true in connection with the ultrahazardous activities doctrine discussed earlier, 19 6
will the requisite EL boundaries be feasible. The underlying criteria,
by themselves, will not suffice as guides to decision. Unlike the checklist of factors in connection with ultrahazardous activities, 97 the factors here do not describe the sorts of activities on the part of
manufacturers that should bring strict liability. Instead, the underlying criteria in roulette-wheel cases describe functional constraints on
the behavior of product users, consumers, and putative victims that
are necessary for an EL insurance system to mitigate adverse selection
and moral hazard. Because the common factors derived from roulette-wheel scenarios do not describe activities in which enterprises engage, it would be inherently impossible for courts to employ those
factors to formulate, ahead of time, workable categories of commercial activities upon which to impose EL.
Might it be possible, in the alternative, for courts or legislatures
to elaborate upon the fact patterns giving rise to the echoes of EL,
thereby establishing bright-line categories of commercial activities
upon which to impose strict liability? For example, this Article earlier
identified the low-speed deployment of a standard, driver-side airbag
in Bresnahan as a paradigm of the sort of roulette-wheel fact pattern
giving rise to the echoes of EL described in this Article. Might not
Indeed, the accident in Bresnahandid not come about by the driver's deliberate risk-taking
conduct, but rather by her momentary inadvertence. Id. at 448.
194 See, e.g., Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 517 (3d Cir. 1987) (reversing
lower court grant of summary judgment against plaintiff who died of pancreatitis after six
years of moderate consumption of alcohol).
195 See supra Part I.B.
196
See supra Part I.C.1.
197
See supra note 44.
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courts or legislatures recognize the provision of airbags by automobile
manufacturers to be the functional equivalent of engaging in commercial blasting under the abnormally-dangerous-activity rule, and
thereby hold manufacturers strictly liable for harm directly caused to
vehicle occupants by explosive airbag deployments? At first blush,
such a rule appears plausible enough. Vehicle manufacturers either
provide airbags or they do not, and disputes over whether the device
that injured the plaintiff is or is not an airbag are unlikely to arise
sufficiently frequently, or plausibly, to threaten the system's viability.
Upon reflection, however, a rule imposing EL for harm caused by
airbag deployment would surely prove unworkable. Bresnahan involved a relatively low-speed deployment that caused significant harm,
supporting the conclusion that the forceful deployment of the airbag
made things much worse for the plaintiff. If the rule retained the
factual elements of low speed and significant harm, disputes would
arise over whether the impact in a particular case was or was not "low
speed," or whether the plaintiff's harm was or was not "significant,"
dissolving any hope for maintaining bright-line boundaries. If the
rule abandoned the low-speed impact element, and all airbag deployments-even those at higher speeds-were to give rise to strict liability, then it would be questionable whether such impacts were beyond
the driver's control in a substantial percentage of cases.' 98 And including higher-impact deployments in the EL scheme would introduce intractable issues of causation. Even if an airbag broke the
plaintiff s jaw, should the claim be valid if the airbag also saved the
plaintiff's life? And quite apart from these sorts of problems, singling
out airbags for EL treatment would appear arbitrary. If airbags are
suitable for EL treatment, why not other features of a vehicle's interior that reduce trauma to occupants in collisions but that also are
capable of causing serious injury? In order to avoid the appearance of
arbitrariness, lawmakers would have to include seatbelts in the new EL
regime. 19 9 But one can make the same argument for steering wheels,
steering columns, and dashboards, all of which, when properly de-

198 See generally Steven Peterson et al., Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis, 38 J.L. & ECON. 251 (1995). The authors
conducted statistical analyses of insurance data and police accident reports, concluding
that "drivers of air-bag-equipped cars tend to be more aggressive than drivers of cars not so
equipped, [and] that their added aggressiveness diminishes the protection afforded drivers of cars equipped with air bags and imposes additional risks on occupants and passengers in other vehicles." Id. at 262. But see Fridulv Sagberg et al., An Investigation of
BehaviouralAdaptation to Airbags and Antilock Brakes Among Taxi Drivers,29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 293, 301 (1997) (concluding that drivers increase risk-taking behavior in
response to accident-reducing measures, such as antilock brakes, to a greater extent than
for injury-reducing measures, such as airbags).
199 See supra Part I.B.
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signed, assist some vehicle occupants by reducing the severity of acci20 0
dent-related trauma.
These problems of line-drawing and demarcation would haunt
and ultimately defeat any attempt to establish a workable EL system
for harm resulting from generic product hazards. In connection with
judicial extensions of failure-to-warn doctrine, the decision in Ayers, in
which parents recovered when their infant son inhaled baby oil and
suffered brain injury,20 1 may be understandable in light of the roulette-wheel implications of keeping such a product in a home occupied by young children. But what about feeding young children
peanut butter? Or marshmallows? In two well-known appellate deci20 2
sions condoning liability based on failure to warn of these risks,

parents were either feeding the children or supervising them when
the accidents occurred. In both cases, courts held that juries should
decide, as in the baby oil case, whether the manufacturers are liable
for failure to warn. These extensions of liability are clearly questionable. As in McGuire, involving distilled spirits consumed by chronic
drinkers, manufacturers of foodstuffs cannot control the various ways
in which children, with or without parental supervision, consume
their products. It follows that the EL-based insurance implicit in
stretching failure-to-warn doctrine to hold manufacturers responsible
for such post-distribution consumer behavior will not prove viable in
the longer run.20 3 One arrives at the same conclusions in response to

a wide range of cases in which children suffer harm interacting with

200 Lest the reader balk at the idea that such components serve a purpose analogous to
that of airbags-or think that doctrinal mechanisms are not already in place to address
instances of harm caused by such components-the case law bears out the facts that (a)
both manufacturers and consumers take quite seriously the safety function of, for example,
collapsible steering columns; and (b) courts have consistently applied to claims of harm
caused by such components the standard doctrines of either negligence (for claims of
defective design) or strict liability (for claims of manufacturing defect). See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 551 F. Supp. 977 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (finding
an absence of proof that collapsible steering column malfunctioned), affd, 720 F.2d 662
(3d Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision); Kurzke v. Nissan Motor Corp., 752 A.2d 708,
713-15 (NJ. 2000) (reversing the trial court's forum non conveniens dismissal of plaintiff's
suit for an accident that occurred in Germany-in a vehicle that the plaintiffs were induced to purchase by representations that the collapsible steering column would serve the
purpose of an airbag-because proof of negligent design of the vehicle's steering column
would be better facilitated in New Jersey); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 692 P.2d 345,
347 (Idaho 1984) (litigating issue of whether steering column properly collapsed).
201 Ayers v.Johnson &Johnson Baby Prods. Co., 797 P.2d 527 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990),
affid, 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash. 1991); see also supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing Ayers).
See Fraust v. Swift & Co., 610 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Emery v. Federated
202
Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 (Mont. 1993).
See supra 172-73 and accompanying text.
203
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products clearly intended primarily for adult use and consumption. 20 4
Only those who manage risks of those sorts can insure against themparents and others entrusted with the care of young children. When
manufacturers can adjust product designs cost-effectively to reduce or
eliminate these risks, courts should, and will, hold manufacturers liable if they fail to make those adjustments. 20 5 But holding manufacturers liable for failing to warn that young children sometimes choke on
various sorts of commercially distributed food imposes the functional
equivalent of EL, and courts should proceed cautiously when considering whether to extend failure-to-warn doctrine.
These same problems of line-drawing will plague judicial attempts to extend other roulette-wheel scenarios beyond their bounds.
Consider, for example, the Hon decision, in which a young man's family survived summary judgment when relatively moderate beer consumption triggered a rare and fatal disease. 20 6 As discussed earlier,
that decision may make sense on its facts. But what levels of alcohol
20 7
consumption should courts consider "moderate" for EL purposes?
It is one thing for courts occasionally and surreptitiously to stretch
traditional liability rules to allow recovery when confronted with a fact
pattern containing powerful roulette-wheel characteristics. It would
be quite another to attempt to expand upon these isolated examples
and create a formal and more widely applicable liability rule. To the
extent that open-ended versions of the consumer expectations test for
defective product design 20 8 and the informed-choice test for failure to
warn that was considered in the previous Part 2 9 constitute thinly
veiled attempts to achieve EL on a case-by-case, 'jury's whim" basis,
they should be rejected for their inherent lawlessness. 210 Occasional
stretches of traditional liability rules are preferable to cynical, higherprofile abandonments of the rule of law.

204
See, e.g.,Jennings v. BIC Corp., 181 F.3d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding manufacturer of lighters not strictly liable for the foreseeable injuries to a child because the
lighters "are not intended to be used as children's playthings").
205 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
206 Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1987).
207 Compare McGuire v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990), rev'd, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (holding that chronic alcoholics who consumed
massive quantities of liquor on a daily basis could pursue a lawsuit against the liquor distiller for failing to warn about the alcohol-induced illnesses that eventually killed the plaintiffs), with Hon, 835 F.2d at 511 (holding that plaintiff could recover when moderate beer
consumption resulted in pancreatitis).
208 See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text.
210
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 87 Cornell L. Rev. 998 2001-2002

2002]

ECIOES OFENTERPRISE LIABILITY
CONCLUSION

The echoes of enterprise liability described in this analysis should
be interesting not only to students of American products liability but
also to students of the legal process. Good and sufficient reasons exist
for keeping design and warning litigation focused primarily on manufacturers' negligence even if some courts insist on doing so under the
largely symbolic rubric of "strict liability." Imposing a broad-based system of strict enterprise liability for generic product hazards would
place manufacturers in the untenable position of insuring against accidental losses over which product users, consumers, and victims exercise substantial control. Not only would causation issues be difficult to
resolve, but the capacity of insureds to increase the likelihood and
magnitude of claims upon, and after, coming within insurance coverage would threaten to destroy the integrity of those systems under the
combined assaults of adverse selection and moral hazard. Writers who
advocate across-the-board enterprise liability for all the harms that
products cause either do not understand how insurance works or are
referring to a dream world of Platonistic forms.
And yet fact patterns arise that offer compelling reasons for
courts to depart from traditional negligence and impose strict enterprise liability on manufacturers for harm caused by generic product
hazards. These are roulette-wheel situations in which would-be claimants sensibly choose to expose themselves or others to remote risks of
substantial product-related harms and are not, after making the
threshold choice to use or consume, in a position deliberately to increase the likelihood or magnitude of loss. The ideal judicial reaction
to these situations might be to fashion black-letter rules recognizing
these roulette-wheel circumstances and condoning the imposition of
strict liability up front. But the criteria for identifying these fact patterns cannot serve as workable boundaries for enterprise liability.
Consequently, courts confronting roulette-wheel scenarios may
stretch existing rules of decision to reach the desired outcomes.
Courts seem to enjoy greater success in this regard when they manipulate failure-to-warn doctrine. Risks that they would normally deem too
remote or too obvious to require warnings suddenly become the basis
of successful claims of failure to warn. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that these outcomes do not induce manufacturers to issue what would
be useless warnings; rather, manufacturers treat the outcomes for
what they really are-impositions of strict enterprise liability-and insure accordingly.
In and of themselves, these echoes of enterprise liability constitute rational judicial responses to the understandable human impulse
to shift accidental losses suffered by a relatively few victims over to
commercial enterprises that can insure those losses and spread them
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among the greater number who benefit from use and consumption of
the products involved. Courts must exercise care, however, to resist
amplifying these echoes into loud choruses of liability-to resist building on these doctrinal stretches to establish wide-reaching and economically ruinous insurance systems that will not work. It follows that
these echoes of enterprise liability must remain what they are: isolated, understandable reflections of communitarian themes that run
deep in American products liability. Extended beyond their unique
boundaries, they portend trouble for design and warning litigation in
the years to come.
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